Finding Truth in the War Narrative by Drew, Ian
Regis University
ePublications at Regis University
All Regis University Theses
Spring 2015
Finding Truth in the War Narrative
Ian Drew
Regis University
Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.regis.edu/theses
This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by ePublications at Regis University. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Regis
University Theses by an authorized administrator of ePublications at Regis University. For more information, please contact epublications@regis.edu.
Recommended Citation
Drew, Ian, "Finding Truth in the War Narrative" (2015). All Regis University Theses. 640.
https://epublications.regis.edu/theses/640
 
 
Regis University  
Regis College  
Honors Theses  
 
 
Disclaimer
 
 
 
Use of the materials available in the Regis University Thesis Collection 
(“Collection”) is limited and restricted to those users who agree to comply with 
the following terms of use. Regis University reserves the right to deny access to 
the Collection to any person who violates these terms of use or who seeks to or 
does alter, avoid or supersede the functional conditions, restrictions and 
limitations of the Collection.  
 
The site may be used only for lawful purposes. The user is solely responsible for 
knowing and adhering to any and all applicable laws, rules, and regulations 
relating or pertaining to use of the Collection.  
 
All content in this Collection is owned by and subject to the exclusive control of 
Regis University and the authors of the materials. It is available only for research 
purposes and may not be used in violation of copyright laws or for unlawful 
purposes. The materials may not be downloaded in whole or in part without 
permission of the copyright holder or as otherwise authorized in the “fair use” 
standards of the U.S. copyright laws and regulations.  
 
Name: Ian Drew       Major: Political Economy  
Finding Truth in the War Narrative 
 
Advisor’s Name: Daniel Clayton  
Reader’s Name: Nathan Matlock  
 This paper explores military and media relations and dynamics beginning from the 
Vietnam War in the 1960s to the modern wars raging in the Middle East today with the intention 
of attempting to find truth within the complex narratives of wartime. Primarily, war narratives if 
taken from only a single source are incomplete, as there are multiple perspectives to consider 
while sifting through these stories. What is created is not simply an either/or narrative that we 
often believe, instead we get a narrative of both/and. Soldiers are both victims and perpetrators, 
Newsmen and women are both informers and misleaders. Multiple sources are considered here, 
including Hal Moore’s We Were Soldiers Once, Sebastian Junger’s film Restrepo, and Evan 
Wright’s Generation Kill. Such narratives are interwoven with multiple perspectives from 
soldiers and media personnel alike and, in doing so, integrate these perspectives in a way that 
allows us to get close to what the truth may be. There is no one simple truth to war, but through 
analyzing the perspectives of each narrative it is possible for us to get close.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FINDING TRUTH IN THE WAR NARRATIVE: AN 
INTEGRATION OF MEDIA 
 
A thesis submitted to 
Regis College 
The Honors Program 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for Graduation with Honors 
 
by 
 
Ian Drew 
 
 
 
 
May 2015
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
Thesis written by 
Ian Drew 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by 
 
__________________________________________________________________  
Thesis Advisor 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________  
Thesis Reader 
 
Accepted by 
 
__________________________________________________________________  
Director, University Honors Program 
  
 
 
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
PREFACE and ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS      iv 
I. INTRODUCTION: A MATTER OF UNDERSTANDING   1 
II. THE P.R. NIGHTMARE        6 
III. SOLDIER AND JOINT CONTROL 25 
IV. INTEGRATION IN THE MODERN ERA 38 
V. CONCLUSION 51 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 53 
 
 
iv 
 
Preface and Acknowledgements 
This project has been a long time coming. I’ve always found myself fascinated 
with war narratives and how we interpret stories of war. In a certain sense, we have all 
been touched by war in some ways. For many of us war is the culture we were raised in. 
How these narratives are shaped and how we perceive these narratives will ultimately 
determine how we remember these history-making events. I wanted to get at the core of 
these narratives, I wanted to see where they come from and how we continue to tell these 
stories of wartime while also finding the best way to do so. War and media is a messy 
relationship, one that is incredibly hard to navigate, but one that I ultimately found myself 
enthralled in.  
There are really too many people to thank for the completion of this project. I 
want to give thanks to my wonderful friends and family for giving me guidance and 
picking me up while I was down, to Drs. Clayton and Matlock for being my patient and 
helpful advising committee, and to everyone else who has made my time at Regis the best 
four years of my life. I also want to thank my family members who have served in the 
military: Uncle Dan, Ben, Uncle Don, and my Grampa Drew. This project exists because 
of all of these people; as such I dedicate this thesis to all of them
1 
 
  
 
I. Introduction: A Matter of Understanding 
I don’t know what war is. I haven’t the slightest idea what it feels like to lay down 
my life for my country, what it feels like to have men and women actively trying to kill 
me on a daily basis, what it means to be changed by a wave of violence so terrible one 
can hardly bear to talk about it. I simply cannot understand what these men and women 
of the armed forces have been through without having experienced it firsthand; 
everything I have learned about war has come from accounts of the media. How these 
conflicts are remembered, in the end, come directly from those who report on it, whether 
they are active combatants or the journalists that cover them. I don’t know what war is, 
but I can get a sense through different channels of media.  This thesis will argue that 
media has come to be in control of the war narrative and therein that control has affected 
the ways that these stories are told. All told, this will help guide through the question of 
where the truth lies in regards to the war narrative while illustrating that integration 
between media and military is the best way to shine a light on the truth of war. If we can 
provide a dual voice coming from civilian and military sources we may be able to see 
truths become evident. We can see this begin with the media taking control of the war 
narrative during the Vietnam War, with a sharp focus on how the reporters shaped the 
war. Furthermore we see how the Vietnam War is remembered due to the coverage it was 
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given. But what of the soldiers’ voices? How has their relationship with the media 
changed over time? We can begin to derive the truths of war once we see their voices 
emerge and engage with the media that reports their narratives. 
My generation arguably has been formed by war. For twelve years the United 
States has been involved in two foreign conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for many 
of us this was the entirety of our formative years; these were years of seeing the death 
and destruction of war on the television. Those images, more than anything else at the 
time shaped for me what war really is. It seemed like an incessant bombardment of 
violence, wide shots of distant bombings, close ups of burnt out husks of cars caught in a 
crossfire; yet I cannot remember any footage of interviews with soldiers during prime 
time, at least not at the outset. Not only that, but no bodies from the carnage were shown. 
The true war seemed hidden behind newscasts and censorship hidden behind the screen 
of the television, where we could only see brief windows of the true conflict. All we can 
see are the scant few views of what combat left in its wake, minus the death. What any of 
these news reports truly amounted to were political bickering between talking heads that 
only looked at the big picture, and not the moment to moment costs paid by the people 
involved. 
It was not until my father sat me down on the anniversary of D-Day, during a year 
I can’t fully remember, and watched Band of Brothers on the History Channel. That was 
the first time I even got a taste of what being in combat could look like, and it was 
coming from a Hollywood (albeit nonfiction) source. Granted, the story is still a heroic 
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look at war, yet the tale of Easy Company was unfurled before me in a bloody look at 
history. Soldiers you grew to care for were torn away from the viewer, but also from their 
dear brothers in arms. We sat and watched the transformation of these projections of real 
people from wide-eyed recruits on their first boat to Europe to grizzled, battle-weathered 
veterans who not only lost friends but also pieces of themselves along the way.  
Not only that, but each episode was prefaced by an interview from a surviving 
member of Easy Company where the soldiers recounted their experiences sometimes 
through teary eyes and other times with hard-earned stoicism. These were men that 
walked through the gates of hell and lived to tell about it. It took such little effort to see it 
in their faces, cragged with age as they were, but even this was not the full story of what 
war was to these men. We saw their experience reenacted on the screen, their heroics, 
their triumphs, their downfalls, their mistakes, yet we could only get scarce bits and 
pieces of what happened within their own minds let alone what followed them post-war.  
These were the heroes of the Greatest Generation, the personification of the Myth 
of the Good War. These mythical heroes, like General Patton, who I learned in school 
were the cream of the American crop, the best the country had to offer to the rest of the 
world. This is where I began to feel a divide between what I’d learned and what I was 
learning. Not every action these men made were heroic, and their battles were far from 
the romanticized tales we’d learned in school. That’s not to say these men aren’t heroes, 
but to me there was more to the story that wasn’t present in what I’d learned; there was 
more to the story that Band of Brothers had only begun to touch upon for me.  
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That is when I began to learn more about Vietnam. It was a fascinating war of a 
disillusioned America who questioned the motives of those who declared the war and 
those brave few who fought it. This was the war that brought war to the living rooms of 
every household with a television in America with horrifying clarity. Reporters swarmed 
the country in force, covering as much of the war as they could, giving a terrifying face to 
the war against the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong guerillas. Tales of heroics were 
scarce; tales of horrors were in abundance. We began to see narratives emerging where a 
“loss of faith” replaced the patriotism that the myth of The Good War hoped to foster 
(Hynes 182). The new face of war was a soldier with a microphone in his face while the 
world erupted behind him, but how different was this war from World War II, really? 
Atrocities are a part of war that thus far in history have been inescapable. Yet what came 
back to the home-front was the ugly side of war that had not yet been witnessed, and the 
“ghoulish behavior” of troops during war was brought to light. But  what made the 
atrocities in Vietnam have so much more relevance and venom for the audience back at 
home? Did war change, or was it the media involvement? 
It is not that journalists weren’t involved in wars in the past; the history of the war 
correspondent can be traced all the way back to the Crimean War in 1856. It was the 
nature of the coverage that changed, and to say that change was stark would be an 
understatement. The journalists of the past did not gloss over details, though they were 
certainly known to drive literary drama at the forefront of their reporting. However, in 
Vietnam it became a case of reporting the cold hard facts of the war, making it seem 
almost mechanical in nature. Soldiers inspired by the Greatest Generation before them 
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were personified as killing machines who, to the public, were little more than baby-killers 
to spit on upon their return home. Any acts of heroism were buried beneath the grime of 
war, and, for the first time, the public got a true sense of what war could be. 
This became my fascination. Through watching Band of Brothers with my father I 
knew that media had shaped my own viewpoints of war, but hadn’t thought about just 
how much the media did so. It was true, though, everything I knew of the modern 
conflicts came from news reports and that same talking head debate that raged on every 
television. I knew from stories of my uncle’s deployments in Kuwait that the media had 
caused my family to fear for his life although he was safe and sound. One thing has 
become clear to me; war is influenced by media and the media is influenced by war. In 
turn, it begins to affect everyone and through that we create our memories of wartime. 
Through this exploration, I will not only show the media’s evolution in the theater 
of war but also prove its importance to the continued growth of our culture and our future 
attitudes and memories in times of war.  
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II. The P.R. Nightmare 
When we think back on the Vietnam War we think about the venomous three-
pronged relationship between the media, the military, and the U.S. government, one 
usually defined by mistrust and censorship placed into direct conflict with the reporter’s 
incessant search for the truth. From the World Wars to Korea, the media was usually held 
to be a source of patriotism, a call to action by the American people to support their 
soldiers abroad. Though heavily censored, as keeping with military policy, these 
correspondents towed the line, providing the image to the public that was conducive to 
the myths of the Good War. In Vietnam, we saw that this began to change. Here we saw 
correspondents become the untethered loose cannons of the battlefield whose opinions 
shaped foreign policy and eventually the outcome of the war. Here, the war 
correspondent became one untethered by military policy, and one that systemically set off 
a chain reaction in the portrayal of warfare that drastically changed how we represent 
military conflict.  
We cannot, however, simply dive in to the untethering of the war correspondent 
without giving ample historical background in which to frame the discussion. At the 
outset of the American military presence in South Vietnam, reporters were given the 
instruction to “keep the line being given out in Washington” namely, that the American 
advisers “were only advisers” with no active participation in hostilities between North 
and South Vietnam (Knightley 375). In fact, most newspapers at the time focused on the 
venom towards Communism held by the American people in the 50s and 60s. Leo 
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Cherne, of Look Magazine wrote in 1955, “the South Vietnamese are too weary to resist 
the Reds without us (Knightley 375).” This was the classic reporting of the WWII era in 
the form of propaganda meant to incite the populous against a common enemy-- the “red 
menace” that so permeated American culture. We can deduce, then, the media was 
relatively in favor of supporting efforts to stave off the Communist menace that the 
American public perceived. In fact, as Melvin Small writes in his book Covering Dissent: 
the Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement, “the media [does] not look favorably 
upon movements that oppose official policy (Small 13).” Small comes to the finding that 
despite reporters leaning liberally, the editors of papers such as the Times tend to be more 
conservative when it comes to publishing controversial stories. In his book, Small 
mentions Times Editor A. M. Rosenthal, who would at times reject stories that would 
conflict with his own views on the war at hand. Beyond this, when the first bombing 
campaign came to North Vietnam in 1965, protests or anti-war activities were scarcely 
touched by news media. By not having a place on the “news agenda,” the American 
public could deduce that it was not a national issue worth considering, and it was not 
until they became a staple of American reporting that people’s opinions began to sway. 
Certainly, activities such as these would have kept the perception among the American 
people that we were doing the right thing by conducting war against the Communist 
agitators, especially when it came to painting anti-war demonstrators in the early days as 
“disruptive or dangerous” as most Americans were lead to believe (Small 20).”  
However, once the first American advisers are killed in South Vietnam in July of 
1959 the reporting shifted to encompass the true violence occurring in Vietnam. Time 
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magazine published the story, a bloody affair where two American officers were killed by 
Communist infiltrators in a residential compound. As the magazine writes, “Communist 
infiltrators have stepped up their campaign of terrorism, assassinating an average of one 
South Vietnamese a day… but not since 1957 had the Communists dared to attack any 
Americans (Reporting Vietnam 1).”  
These first attacks of guerilla warfare perpetrated against American advisors and 
troops foreshadowed the alien-nature of this war. We were fighting an enemy in Vietnam 
that “fled” within “minutes [of] Vietnamese troops” arriving on the scene, hit and run 
attacks that would reflect the brutal nature of the war (Reporting Vietnam). This was not 
in keeping with the myth of the purely “Good vs. Evil” war in Europe and Japan. Instead 
the public was slowly being shown that war was messy and complicated. The Vietnam 
War had no front, no lines to cross, it had blurred boundaries that made reporting a 
complicated matter where the newsmen and women were caught between reporting what 
was right and what would get them views and front page status.   
The current South Vietnamese government at the time would allow none of the 
brutal stories, instead opting to censor the American correspondents. As Philip Knightley 
writes in his book The First Casualty, the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam 
sought to censor foreign correspondents in any way they could. Reporters were deemed 
“spies and Communists” while agents attempted to intimidate reporters into conforming 
to governmental standards. This complied with American Military policy at the time, 
using the “US newsman” as a medium for relations with the South Vietnamese with the 
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hope that the correspondents would adhere to “Vietnamese press guidance (Hammond et. 
al. 11).” In essence, the military wanted journalists to act as mediators for the reporting 
on Vietnamese hostilities, keeping Diem supportive of American involvement while 
hopefully keeping the news reports favorable about the American presence. This, 
according to military brass at the time, became the beating heart of the controversy, with 
journalists wanting to cover as much of the war as possible in contention with the 
Vietnamese government’s wishes to contain that coverage. However, this did not mean 
that the coverage of the war automatically became a negative commentary, far from it. In 
fact, the press about American involvement was still optimistic about the conflict, and 
would continue to be so until the infamous Tet Offensive in 1968.  
The journalists, though, had no trouble getting access to the boots on the ground. 
“We were right with the soldiers,” Walter Cronkite writes, “we talked to them; they 
talked to us, G.I.s and officers alike. The military did not make any attempt to monitor 
the interviews we got with the [soldiers in Vietnam] (Reporting America at War 2003).” 
Despite the military’s attempts to keep the media reined in from the higher levels of the 
conflict, at the ground level the correspondents had near unlimited access. Anything the 
soldiers would say to the reporters was free game to report on. While the military had 
hoped to steer the press away from the grip of Diem and towards progress made by allied 
forces, they could not hope to control the individuals that had spread out across the 
American deployment. Although journalists such as Cronkite seemed to genuinely want 
to convey the plight of the soldiers overseas, others chose to focus their efforts on the 
higher elements of South Vietnamese and American militaries.  
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David Halberstam, a Pulitzer-winning reporter for the New York Times, went to 
great lengths to expose the secrets being covered up by the military brass in Vietnam, 
despite a period of great optimism that the war effort was going well. Halberstam found 
himself in Vietnam in September of 1962, where the State Department insisted that “the 
U.S. and its South Vietnamese allies were winning their war against a communist 
insurgency, [however] Halberstam found another story when he followed the troops into 
the field (Achievement.org).” Like Cronkite, Halberstam found the real stories with the 
boots on the ground where he learned that the North was actually being favored in the 
rural areas in lieu of the US-backed Saigon. These stories were immediately shot down 
by the press as untruthful and misleading. Accusations began to echo out from foreign 
correspondents regarding deception from military officials about the true extent of the 
involvement in Vietnam, stoking the flames of the journalistic fervor in Vietnam, thus 
beginning the push for not only more comprehensive coverage, but also for more 
criticisms. Nevertheless, the military held that “it is not… in our interest… to have stories 
indicating that the Americans are leading and directing combat missions against the Viet 
Cong,” asserting that the newsman stationed in Vietnam created “thoughtless criticism” 
to incite harmful relations against the Diem regime (Hammond 15). However, the public 
would soon learn that this was not the case. Halberstam reported on a battle with Viet 
Cong forces during a stint in Saigon that dealt a significant blow to military credibility. In 
his story, he quotes a Lieutenant-Colonel stating that the South Vietnamese soldiers were 
“cowardly” and explained “how well the Viet Cong had fought” off the US-backed 
troops (Knightley 378).” The South Vietnamese, when coupled with their volatile 
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government, were not the fighting force that the United States had expected, even with 
their training and arms provisions. This lead many Saigon-based correspondents to level 
complaints at the despotic Diem, claiming that his misappropriation of force was causing 
the South Vietnamese to further lose ground that was already unsteady. 
This conflict came to a head with the coup d’etat against Ngo Binh Diem in 
November 1963. Halberstam, at that point being labeled a sensationalist by the military, 
reported an unflinching account of the coup where he pulled few punches against the 
Diem establishment. “These [colonels and generals],” Halberstam writes, “felt that the 
Government was provoking a major crisis and that its refusal to meet some of the 
Buddhist demands was arrogant and self-defeating.” What Halberstam highlighted here, 
was that even the South Vietnamese felt that the Diem government was corrupt but their 
views were silenced by the censorship implemented by the regime. As more stories were 
smuggled out of Vietnam, these reports on the coup were the beginning of a long trend of 
hard-hitting reports that would fundamentally shape the public opinion of the Vietnam 
War. It was up to these reporters, like Halberstam, in Vietnam to get to the truth of the 
matter explained to the larger numbers beyond themselves. In this case, the reporting on 
the power struggle from within our allies in the war was the most important objective in 
providing understanding back to their audience in the States. It was the reporter’s duty to 
find the corruption in this growing time of war and to report the truths that the foreign 
government sought to keep hidden. 
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This begs the question, though, of whether the reporters should keep to their 
imposed role of public relations ambassador or report the war as they see fit. There are of 
course, massive political benefits to maintaining good relations between the United States 
and foreign governments, especially when assisting in wartime, but does that outweigh 
the reporter’s duty of sending the facts back to the home front where people have a right 
to know these facts? Halberstam, of course, did not only report on the mistakes and 
missteps of US involvement, but also praised some of the work done by US advisers and 
the South Vietnamese. According to Hammond et al, “Halberstam was also optimistic… 
reinforced official contentions that US assistance was paying off (Hammond 20).” By 
keeping a balanced act of reporting, correspondents like Halberstam were able to keep the 
peace while also reporting when things go wrong and why, significantly adding to his 
credibility. Certainly, it would be impossible for all stories coming out of a war zone to 
be positive, as the US government quickly learned during the coup of Diem in 1963 in an 
event they refer to as “The Buddhist Crisis.” An infamous picture emerges from the coup 
in 1963, that of monk Thich Quang Duc lighting himself ablaze in a protest suicide. This 
is a striking photo, a horrifying image of what happens on a warfront that was brought to 
the Associated Press by Malcolm Brown. 
The implications of this photo, along with the way the South Vietnamese military 
sought to handle the Buddhist outcry against the Diem regime, created a public relations 
nightmare for the US government. “Unhappy in the extreme to have American-armed and 
trained South Vietnamese soldiers brutally repressing… demonstrators,” caused a 
massive hit to public opinion on United States involvement in Vietnam (Hammond et. al 
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41). All the while, journalists were forced to smuggle the copy of their stories to Hong 
Kong and Singapore in order to get them printed back in the United States without fear of 
Vietnamese censorship. These reports and photographs forced the Kennedy 
administration to “reassess its relationship with Diem,” and the United States began to 
witness the incredible power journalism can wield over public opinion. However, this 
does not take into account the manipulation of these powerful, horrible moments just for 
the sake of fulfilling the agenda of the media through those reports. This agenda, as we 
will see, revolves around a reporter’s search for high ratings, front page postings, and a 
spotlight on their careers. As Peter Arnett writes about his experience in a Vietnam 
market, “I could have prevented [an] immolation by… kicking the gasoline away. As a 
human being I wanted to. As a reporter I couldn’t… My role as a reporter would have 
been destroyed along with my credibility.” Had Arnett helped the man, the photo 
opportunity would have been ruined, and he would not have gained as much fame for 
providing the truths of the monk suicides back to the States. That attitude breeds a 
complicated set of scenarios. Would the monk be grateful to have his life saved, or would 
he feel slighted that his statement could not be made? Is Arnett’s fame-seeking 
photography a projection of the monk’s protest or is it simply self-serving? Those sets of 
questions make the truth in reporting Vietnam murky at best and hypocritical at worst.  
With the fall of Diem came a period of violent volatility in South Vietnam, with 
Congress and the President hesitant to ramp up involvement against Communist forces 
given the inherent volatility of the region. The war’s approval ratings begin to plummet 
leading up to Tet in 1968, falling from 57% of people wanting to continue our 
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involvement in Vietnam to 43%. This was only complicated by the media’s uncovering 
of the journal of Captain Edward Shank, an air force pilot who was placed on airstrike 
runs by the South Vietnamese. In his journal, he details his opinion that the South 
Vietnamese are losing the war, a fact that could be remedied by the supply of better 
warplanes and weapons. However, in general journalistic coverage of the war was still 
marginally favorable in the mid-1960s and in turn, the people believed that the war was 
turning in our favor and given the assurances of the media and General Westmoreland; 
the war would end within a few years. That was, of course, until the Tet Offensive in 
1968. 
Leading up to the Vietnamese holiday Tet, hostilities had begun to deescalate, and 
an informal truce was in place due to the holiness of the holiday to the Vietnamese 
people. Communist forces used this to their advantage, using the movement of South 
Vietnamese forces who were on leave to cover their own advances and prepare for their 
surprise assault on city targets, Saigon and the Hue Citadel among them. On January 31, 
1968 the North Vietnamese launched their first wave of assaults that battered both South 
Vietnamese and American forces, with all sides sustaining heavy losses.1 While both the 
U.S. and the North Vietnamese eventually claimed victory after prolonged months of 
heavy combat, the media wasn’t quite convinced. Coverage during the Tet Offensive was 
both continuous and bloody, where the general rules of censorship were laid to the side in 
order to portray to the American people the true brutality of the Offensive. In the 
documentary The Vietnam War with Walter Cronkite, the “voice of the nation” walks the 
                                                          
1 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/tet 
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audience through the carnage of the Tet Offensive with the reports of the journalists who 
filmed the stories and the footage captured by them. Cameras are aimed squarely on the 
corpses of fallen NVA and Viet Cong troops, and more footage shows American forces 
firing on unseen enemies in the brush and far off buildings. These are striking images that 
the journalists, who are unnamed in the feature, stand in front of giving their own 
personal commentary on the combat while fallen men lay bleeding behind them. They are 
adorned in flak jackets, and their faces wince at the sound of a far off explosion. More 
striking is their willingness to interrupt the combat to interview soldiers in the midst of a 
growing firefight. One such interview finds a soldier in an alleyway, adorned in a 
bandolier of large bullets, and the reporter’s first question is even interrupted by a nearby 
explosion and gunfire. The reporter ducks his head, while the soldier hardly flinches; 
instead he recalls with a certain fondness his preference for fighting in the field since the 
soldiers can “call in an airstrike or something.” Immediately after the interview we are 
shown a hospital in a rough transition to showing brutal images of wounded women and 
children in Saigon. When such images are brought up immediately after interviewing a 
battle-hardened veteran, what is the public to think? This creates an association in the 
minds of the public of associating soldiers with the pain they inflict.  
I see the reporting on the attack on Saigon during the Tet Offensive as the first of 
many moments to come when both media and public opinion began to slip out of the 
American government’s hands. Now, a lot of Americans believe that the Tet Offensive 
was a complete loss for the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces, but this is a myth that has 
been created by the media. The BBC reports on January 31, 1968 that “4,959 Viet Cong 
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[had] been killed… while 232 American… troops [had] been killed” in combat during the 
brunt of the NVA offensive into South Vietnam. By all rights, numbers such as these 
would suggest that the Viet Cong had been steamrolled by the American forces during 
the offensive, yet we believe the opposite had occurred. By all accounts, Tet had been a 
“desperation move by North Vietnam, beset by a relentless American killing machine” 
that the North Vietnamese had hoped would push the Americans into negotiations for de-
escalation (Merry). Where had the myth of such a great American loss originated? In my 
research, I found that it all boiled down to the media’s reporting on the Tet Offensive, 
especially from that of trusted anchor Walter Cronkite. Cronkite, the “voice of America,” 
delivered a damning three minute monologue on the Tet Offensive in order to close out 
his newscast. In light of the pessimism of the war, in light of the voracity of the NVA 
invasion, this was especially harmful to the government in their conducting of the war 
and only served to increase anti-war protests, therein driving the government to search for 
de-escalation tactics. His monologue read thusly: 
“..For it seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam 
is to end in a stalemate. This summer's almost certain standoff will either end in 
real give-and-take negotiations or terrible escalation; and for every means we 
have to escalate, the enemy can match us, and that applies to invasion of the 
North, the use of nuclear weapons, or the mere commitment of one hundred, or 
two hundred, or three hundred thousand more American troops to the battle. And 
with each escalation, the world comes closer to the brink of cosmic disaster. 
To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, 
the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of 
defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in 
stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion. On the off 
chance that military and political analysts are right, in the next few months we 
must test the enemy's intentions, in case this is indeed his last big gasp before 
negotiations. But it is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way 
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out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived 
up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could (Walter 
Cronkite, CBS News 1968).” 
 In this reflection, he brings to voice the pessimism of the American people, and 
with that he brings about the demise of public opinion for the war. If the most trusted 
voice in all of America could not stand with the war, then how could the American 
people? Now, there is some debate over whether or not Cronkite truly had the influence 
that we believe, but there is no doubt that the media coverage at this time did sway public 
opinion against the war.  
 However, a Gallup poll right before the Tet Offensive highlighted that “half of all 
Americans had no idea what the war in Vietnam was about (Knightley 441).” Knightley 
writes in his book The First Casualty, that clearly the job of the journalist to inform the 
American public had utterly failed despite the media coverage. In fact, given the intense 
coverage of the war, how could this have even happened? The media is intended to 
provide the American people with the explanations for conflict, or the reasons why a 
story has occurred. If this fails, the purpose of the media falls apart, and we’re left with 
an organization that merely regurgitates opinions and editorials without providing a 
context for argument. I would argue that this lack of context came from the media’s 
unwavering focus on the violence committed by the armed forces during the war. 
Without providing that context, it becomes increasingly difficult to pinpoint any clear 
truth within the conflict. You cannot clearly see through the violence without the proper 
framing from the media. With the now widespread use of television, too, American 
audiences were not “exposed to what the war meant to the people… whose land it was 
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being fought for” but only the grand drama of the combat and violence of the conflict 
(Knightley 455). That focus was in error, as this does not provide a true war story. A war 
narrative has several facets beyond the violence. Yes, the violence plays a role in the 
telling, yet it is not meant to be the focal point but rather a factor for our understanding 
and consideration. This massive focus on violence, with little doubt, was one of the 
primary causes of the loss of support and confusion of the American people. Through 
being exposed on a regular basis to the carnage being inflicted in Vietnam, the average 
civilian could, for the first time, see war for what it truly was instead of the fictional 
heroism that the public had been given during The Good War from films starring John 
Wayne romanticizing World War II. 
From the coverage of the Tet Offensive, we see this increase in coverage of war 
time atrocities and civilian casualties. The press opened widely here, reporting on 
whatever they deemed fit for home consumption and whatever could get them front page 
status at their respective news agency. Like the aforementioned Peter Arnett, reporters 
had a tendency to skew towards what they knew would get them accolades for their work 
once they returned to the States. This was much unlike previous reports coming from the 
World Wars, as those had been tightly controlled accounts of battles, statistics, and about 
how well soldiers were doing overseas against the enemy. Now that the reporters had 
been let loose, they had the freedom to pursue any fame-seeking benefits they could get 
out of the war, in effect creating their own version of what they deemed to be fit for home 
consumption, despite what messages they may be sending.  
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Those messages include the atrocities that occurred at the hands of soldiers in the 
Vietnam War, the most infamous of which was the My Lai Massacre. “The unthinkable 
[had become] real” and public opinion of the United States military fell into a freefall 
(Hammond). The story broke to the New York Times on November 16th 1968, eight 
months after the massacre on March 16th of the same year. Do Hoai, a villager joined by a 
group of others gave their story to the Times of a village that “had engaged in no hostile 
actions” towards the Americans despite their area being under heavy Viet Cong control 
(Kamm). The locals had come to a total of 567 civilians killed in the massacre, as the 
U.S. soldiers moved into the hamlet using grenades, M-16 rifles, and fire to gather and 
execute the residents. According to the New York Times, military officers such as Capt. 
James L. F. Bowdish (“attorney for” the accused) claimed that the estimates of the 
villagers went “far beyond any figures he had heard (Kamm).” This was a conflict in 
interests between the citizens and the military beyond any doubt, but it would appear that 
it is not simply the number killed that is important. Rather, what matters is that the break 
in the story happened and that atrocities such as these could reach the public eye and have 
their intended effect of pulling away the public from support of the war. Clearly reporting 
on those atrocities is the right thing to do, but more context on the soldiers’ perspective is 
necessary, as stated previously, in order to understand why the atrocities happen. 
In the Cleveland Plain Dealer, a similar story to Henry Kamm’s report in the 
Times ran in 1969, this time with eyewitness accounts from soldiers who were there. “I 
think that probably the officers did not really know if they were ordered to kill the 
villagers or not… a lot of guys feel that the [South Vietnamese] aren’t human beings… 
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we just treated them like animals,” said Michael Terry after his tour in South Vietnam 
(Hersh). Words like “Point-blank murder” were tossed around often and numerously, a 
soldier in the Cleveland article going as far as to compare “the group standing over the 
ditch-just like a Nazi-type,” a comparison that, so soon after WWII, carried with it a 
heavy connotation with evil and genocide (Hersh). It can be easily argued that such 
language was used to draw parallels to a fairly recent war in order to incite memories of 
the rage held towards the Nazis. Doing so would easily allow public opinion to slide even 
further against the war in Vietnam. In these articles, we are provided a mere glimpse of 
the horror of war and the suffering that comes in its wake. These are glimpses into the 
true life of a soldier, one hampered by paranoia, frustration at the loss of friends, and the 
constant threat of death thousands of miles from home. “It’s my belief,” an unnamed 
sergeant in the Cleveland article relays, “that the company was conditioned to do this… I 
think they were expecting [the Viet Cong] to use the people as hostages (Hersh).” This is 
the paranoia incited in war, when an enemy is undefined, when the front line is non-
existent save for claims of territory and patrols by either side; this is a perspective that 
those at home will never experience aside from these sporadic articles of horrific 
atrocities committed overseas. These images are put in stark contrast to the romanticized 
visions of the WWII G.I., the soldier fighting for the greater moral good against an evil 
enemy. This is not an excuse for the actions taken by Lt. Calley and his company in the 
least; what that company inflicted onto those innocents was sadistic and abhorrent. But as 
Samuel Hynes tells us, war creates a strange environment where visions of right and 
wrong become elongated under extreme duress. The media’s coverage of My Lai was a 
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damning blow to an already beleaguered Nixon administration. Even more stories would 
follow that of My Lai, stories that to the military were the “biggest collection of 
malicious innuendo [they] had ever seen,” stories with inflated body counts, stories of 
horrific treatment of prisoners by the South Vietnamese while American soldiers watched 
on, stories of the riots and protests on the home front that continue to tear the country 
apart to this day (Hammond 194). This style of reporting on Vietnam was a necessary 
evil to an extent, but with lasting effects on foreign policy that created a fiasco that the 
United States had hoped to avoid. 
At this point in late 1968 and early 1969, the media “decided that the war was all 
but over,” correspondent participation in the conflict declined, and the media decided to 
refocus their efforts on covering negotiations for ceasefire in Paris (Knightley 438). With 
a story as big as the My Lai massacre, it seemed to the media that all else would pale in 
comparison, despite any continued civilian casualties. Once the story dries up, the media 
moves on to the next one leaving the public to feel as though things are resolving 
themselves. That war hadn’t ended though, and would continue for the United States until 
January 23, 1973 when Nixon announced the end of American involvement. The stories 
had begun to revolve around the gradual withdrawal of troops until then, reflecting the 
frustration at the slowness of that process. As time passed, journalists on the home front 
such as Michal Kerr wondered if “conventional journalism could no more reveal this war 
than conventional firepower could [have won] it (Knightley 466).” Knightley relays the 
battle of  Bien Hoa, a victory for the American forces as far as casualties were concerned, 
though the media noted that despite any American progress well-defended air bases could 
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still be attacked and vulnerable to North Vietnamese assault. The NVA, in the end, could 
only be beaten by “blasting Vietnamese villages into oblivion” and the media was so far 
disillusioned with the military prosecution that no positive media would come out of 
Vietnam until the war had fully come to a close. The reporter who submitted the Bien 
Hoa story, Nicholas Tomalin, even went on record to say that he was a “VC supporter” at 
the end of his report, reflecting the complete loss of trust the media had in United States 
foreign policy. For better or for worse, this change in support would begin to come about. 
It may have been right to shed truth on the war, but to push it to such extremes of altered 
support becomes questionable. We can refer back to the stories of non-lethal tactics that 
actively changed military operation, yet by the end of the war such articles would not 
make the papers. The media grew tired of reporting on Vietnam in the 1970s, most stories 
coming from the war were pushed onto sidebars like Ron Kovic – who I will put into 
more detail later. People grew weary of hearing the war stories, and turned their attention 
elsewhere. For people in the late 60s and early 70s, the Vietnam War was not what they 
believed war to be. It was gruesome, different, and full of atrocities that, to the public, 
were absent from World War II. 
But how much different were these combat policies from World War II tactics? 
This is the distorted truth of the Vietnam War. It played out as all wars do: with violence 
and unimaginable suffering. Nearly all nations involved in “The Good War” had targeted 
civilian targets in one way or the other. Entire cities were leveled by airplanes in Europe, 
and entire cities were destroyed in nuclear fire in the South Pacific. Arguably, despite 
anomalies such as My Lai, many of the policies remained relatively the same as World 
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War II. It was the coverage, however, that changed. War became intensely political, and 
fought against a relatively unknown enemy whom even the government could not clearly 
identify. The myth of The Good War would become tainted by the coming accounts of 
Vietnam veterans post-war. Combat was not the romanticized, “best time of my life” 
tales of their fathers’. Combat was horrifying, and combat was demystifying. Journalists 
in the hundreds now got a taste of that experience, and relayed it as such, with the added 
dimension of their own personal politics as Walter Cronkite and Nicholas Tomlin have 
shown us. This was new territory for the nation, one that was unglamorous and wrought 
with controversy. Still today we see the Vietnam War as being mired in myth and 
entrenched animosity towards the government. The truths in those war stories are 
muddled and lost because of the ways the war had been painted by the military and the 
government.  Combat troops coming home from Vietnam were never spat on as baby-
killers, the army was not an angry, draft-populated body, “the men who fought were 
volunteers, or men who chose not to evade the draft, and [they] had gone to war for 
simple, patriotic motives, as their fathers had gone to World War II (Hynes 183).”  
Vietnam was the first time the nation was presented the utterly complex and 
layered narrative that war presents us, though the public were only given the smallest of 
slices to pull information from. As the nation reeled from the apparent loss in Vietnam, 
the government would rethink their policies for journalistic access as the nation would 
inevitably become embroiled in further conflict beyond its own borders. Journalists, too, 
would have to change their own reporting styles. Yet the journalist only tells one side of 
the narrative: the civilian perspective who does not actively engage in combat. A voice 
24 
 
 
 
that is desperately needed, then, is that of the soldier who lives and dies for the war. The 
media may distort the truths, and it takes more voices in order to get a clearer picture.   
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III. Soldier and Joint Control 
 What, then, is to be learned from the evolving nature of the media’s coverage? 
Well, for starters we can see that there was not a fair coverage about the nature of a 
soldier’s experience. As we saw with the television interviews, any knowledge to be 
gleaned from soldiers came from moments where their versions of the truth have been 
altered by the context of their surroundings. Not only that, but we do not get veterans’ 
speaking on their war experience until the late 70s well after their return home. Time and 
society then become a factor as the storyteller becomes influenced after their experience. 
Because of this, we see that there are parts of the narrative that become common threads 
among multiple storytellers. While each experience is highly individualized, there are 
traces of the media’s influence in the experience of the Vietnam War as a whole. It is 
important, however, to recognize that influence when sifting through the narratives. We 
may then get closer to the truth as we examine the interplay between soldier and media.  
   How, then, was the view of the soldier’s experience distorted? For that, we can 
actually look back to narratives coming out of World War II in the late 40s and 50s. 
Films and stories that were placed into the mainstream media depicted the strongly heroic 
“Greatest Generation” for the masses to take in en masse. Ron Kovic describes in his 
narrative Born on the Fourth of July how profoundly the films of John Wayne and Audie 
Murphy drove home to him how important and gallant it was to be the hero in war. “John 
Wayne in The Sands of Iwo Jima became one of my heroes… like Mickey Mantle,” 
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Kovic writes, and in doing so shows that these war films instilled in him the idea that 
even in early childhood he would be drawn towards serving his nation in the marines 
(Kovic 55). Kovic and his friend predicated their lives on the pact that “when [they 
turned] seventeen [they would] both go down to the marine recruiter…and sign up for the 
United States Marine Corps (Kovic 56).” However, when Kovic is wounded and 
subsequently paralyzed while serving in Vietnam, he ceases to find the heroism in his 
actions. In fact, he gets frustrated over his paralysis. He felt that he had served to become 
a hero for his nation and became little more than a burden to those around him upon his 
return. “Now I wanted to know what I had lost my legs for,” he writes, “why [had I] and 
the others gone [to Vietnam] at all (Kovic 134)?”  It’s not that Kovic was not proud of his 
service, in fact I believe that he values his time serving, but what he experienced during 
his service was not what he expected, nor what he wanted. Kovic, though got lost in his 
disillusionment with his mistreatment on the home front. A sad story, really, about how 
parts of the nation can truly perpetrate a disservice to our veterans once the war has 
ended. I would argue, though, what Kovic finds in his newfound advocacy reflects what 
he always wanted to be: a hero. It’s just that he did not find his heroism where he had 
expected to, nor with the group that he had hoped for as a child. He felt robbed by his 
country, by the media that led him to so desperately seek that heroism and was thanked 
with paralysis and maltreatment in the hospitals.  
 Is the media to blame, then, for his service not meeting his expectations? 
Certainly there are other veterans whose experience truly defined their lives to the extent 
that, when asked “would you serve again,” they answer clearly and bluntly with a definite 
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“yes.” Their views could not have been shaped by those war movies Kovic had grown up 
on, could they? Could the media distort their own memories of coming home and their 
memories of the war? I’d like to visit here a myth that has become so engrained into our 
society that we believe it to be an absolute truth of the Vietnam War, the myth of soldiers 
being spat on as they returned home. We can summarize the myth thusly: soldiers, flying 
into civilian airports on their return to the states were either swarmed with angry 
protestors or individuals enraged by their government’s actions abroad and subsequently 
were rewarded with a medal of spit for their role of “baby-killer” and “government 
murderers.” Jerry Lembcke, a Vietnam veteran himself, discussing his book The Spitting 
Image in an article for the Boston Globe, says it bluntly, “I found nothing. No news 
reports or even claims that someone was being spat on (Lembcke 2005).” He asserts the 
claim that the image of the abused veteran by the anti-war crowd was little more than a 
media and governmental propaganda tool to “dissuade people from opposing the Gulf 
War (Lembcke ix).” It’s an interesting assertion that the United States involvement in 
Vietnam had been so defeating for public policy that such mistreatment myths were 
implemented in order to regain the support for the wars that a new generation of Veterans 
were being shipped off to fight. This policy was “so effective,” Lembcke writes, 
“President Bush had effectively turned the means of war, the soldiers themselves, into a 
reason for the war (Lembcke 2).” Essentially, following Vietnam the soldier’s experience 
was what became the war. Vets and current soldiers were used to create a sympathetic 
atmosphere in which to conduct foreign policy with the full support of the public. If you 
do not support the war, then clearly you do not support the soldiers either. Perpetuating 
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this attitude creates a toxic environment where support is gained for war on the backs of 
those fighting rather than for the reasons the war is being waged. Again, this is the case 
of the media distorting the soldier’s experience but this time it came at the cost of more 
wars.  
Throughout Lembcke’s research, he found that many of the spitting reports boiled 
down to hearsay. A friend of a friend knew a veteran who had been spit on, but that 
friend might have also been a friend’s uncle or some far off acquaintance. The myth has 
taken on many of the qualities of a classic urban legend, where there is a common thread 
that holds the narratives together though there are slight details that shift and change from 
story to story. Details such as who was doing the spitting, where it had occurred, the 
specifics of the personal details of the storyteller all would change as the narrative 
continued. As Lembcke writes, “Stories about spat-upon Vietnam veterans are like 
mercury: Smash one and six more appear (Lebcke 2005).” Of course, it would be only a 
matter of time for the media to latch on to such tales of maltreatment at the hands of a 
venomous public. Even the entertainment media got to project stories of spitting unto the 
masses. In the 1982 film First Blood, the main character John Rambo uses the myth of 
spitting on veterans in a final monologue at the end of the film. “And I come back to the 
world,” he says, “and I see all those maggots at the airport, protesting me, spitting (First 
Blood 1982).” These lines, in and of themselves, have a few problems within. Lembcke 
asserts the claim that when veterans returned from war “GIs landed at military bases, not 
civilian airports” though he admits that “there may have been exceptions (Lembcke 
2005).” Not only that, but how would protestors know that such a flight had been 
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diverted to civilian airspace? If the protestors had been sitting and waiting for the 
veterans, as the myth says, where would they have received such flight information?  
When these myths hit film or other popular culture, they start a cycle where 
anyone can refer back to them and take that fiction as fact. In doing so, some veterans 
who feel disillusioned by their experience can use those myths to help cope with their 
experience upon their return, dropping themselves into a narrative where they can learn to 
handle their own hardships. Lembcke writes that some “soldiers returning from lost wars 
have long healed their psychic wounds by accusing their governments and their 
countrymen of betrayal (Slate 2000).” Such tales provide an outlet for those who have 
suffered above and beyond their call of duty. Certainly, there is little wrong with finding 
solace in such tales, but we have to look at how these stories are perpetuated in society to 
find any truth to the narratives. That is precisely where the media should come in, to shed 
light on the truths to these stories, to give us insight into the experience of our soldiers 
overseas. Instead, as Slate points out, outlets such as New York Times and U.S. News & 
World Report place these stories back into circulation as the 25th anniversary of the end 
of the war came near. John Kifner, in his article titled A Case Study in Disaster for 
Tomorrow’s Generals published on April 28, 2000, contains the line that “[army] cadets 
could not wear their uniforms for fear of being spat on (Kifner 2000).” Even as late as 
2000 people are still perpetuating the myths that veterans hid from anti-war protestors 
when authors such as Lembke have demonstrated that the opposite was true. Certainly 
some soldiers did hide from protestors, but the narrative constructed here does not 
provide for a both/and but rather an either/or. For example, Kifner writes three years later 
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in his article Brutal Vietnam Campaign Stirs Memories that one hundred and fifty 
veterans had joined anti-war movements, even going as far as to testify to war crimes 
committed during the Vietnam War, in direct opposition to the claim that these vets were 
hiding from their service. The truth here becomes not one of cowardice on return, but one 
of engagement. In fact, antiwar protestors brought veterans of the war into the fold, much 
like John Kovic. It was not the antiwar movement that tore the medals from his chest; it 
was the very government that he fought for during his first arrest. Is that truly the public 
mistreating him, or is it the government and media that failed him and so many others? 
These stories that contain myth do not serve their intention; that is, to illuminate the war 
narrative. They only serve to distort these narratives further. If the media is meant to 
show the truth to the people, then they ought to have shed light on these myths in order to 
dispel them instead of only propagate them further. The only way possible to combat 
such actions is to go straight to the source to see more war narratives brought to life by 
the very people who experienced it. 
Quite frankly, to say viewing these narratives is the only way to experience these 
stories seems like a closed off absolute. That is not to say that there cannot be an 
engagement between the soldier’s memoirs and media sources, as there are, but it 
remains a strong way to see the war through the eyes of those who experienced it first 
hand in combat. When we look at narratives such as Terry Rizzutti’s The Second Tour we 
see through their supposed fictional accounts kernels of truths to their own experience. 
“But life’s a bitch – and then you die,” Rizzutti writes as a reflection on his combat 
experience (Rizzutti 3). He reflects much of the same frustration with his country that 
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Kovic presents in his novel, a country that “exploited [the youth] in the name of 
patriotism” and sent him to a war that he didn’t ask for. We were “used and abused,” he 
tells a doctor early on in his narrative, “This country hasn’t learned a damn thing. It’s 
going to happen again and again (Rizzutti 6).”  
While the media can be a crisscrossing web of half-truth and finger pointing, the 
soldier’s narrative contains concurrent strings of feeling that is passed over when such 
stories get relayed to the media. Both Kovic and Rizzutti reflect a frustration with the war 
they fought, and the media that led them there. Rizzutti, like Kovic, discusses the 
influences that on-screen war heroes like John Wayne and Audie Murphy had on the 
young men entering the war in Vietnam. Instead of discussing the influence on himself, 
Terry Rizzutti notices (through the eyes of his character Rootie) the effect it had on a 
fresh recruit younger than him. He tells us, “We named him Audie Murphy based on his 
desire to win medals. ‘I’m gonna start slow,’ he said, ‘just a bronze star at first, maybe a 
silver after a while (Rizzutti 12).” He later describes this recruit being killed not even two 
months into his rotation in Vietnam. The inspirations of the mythological war heroes of 
the Greatest Generation were a dangerous prospect for those who fought and died in 
Vietnam. For Ron Kovic, it saw his disillusionment take a very real place in the great 
history of the Vietnam War, the war that saw the disparagement of the idea that there 
could ever be a good war.  
What was this war to the soldiers? Well, in Walter Cronkite’s Tet Offensive 
documentary we get a glimpse of a soldier having some down time with his comrades. 
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When asked if he sought revenge on the enemy he hardly hesitated to answer the 
affirmative. Terry Rizzutti reflects the same sentiment in his novel, “When your buddies 
are dying and you know a way to stop it, you stop it. At one level, stopping it means 
killing all that moves before it kills you. The safety rule we called it (Rizzutti 9).” We can 
tie this back to the idea that war creates a strange environment; in this strange 
environment, you must kill in order to save lives and to preserve is to eliminate. When 
the news gives us that short clip of a soldier seeming to pine for revenge, we’re missing 
the whole story. We’re missing the narrative of the man who has seen too much evil for 
one lifetime. Since he remains anonymous as per the interview it is impossible to 
research into his story, but reasonable assumptions can be made. Yes, soldiers can and do 
commit terrible acts – it comes with the territory. However, they can be portrayed in a 
way that highlights their environment and how that affects their behavior. Since soldiers 
have a duality of victim and perpetrator they must be portrayed as both without leaning 
too far in either direction.  These men who are mired in combat are seeing and acting 
upon orders that the ordinary man simply is not meant to act upon. They are actively 
changed by their environment and hardened into people unrecognizable from their 
departure into war. “No man goes through war without being changed by it,” writes 
Samuel Hynes, “…And though that process will not be explicit in every narrative… it 
will be there (Hynes 3).” These are what we can derive from the soldier’s narrative: the 
ways that they have changed from the conflict even if they are not immediately apparent. 
These are the raw stories that provide outsiders’ insight into what war is, and giving the 
soldiers that narrative control is vital. War isolates, war destroys, and the straight 
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personal narrative can give us those brief flashes of truth, even if the majority of the 
population will never “be there.” 
What happens, though, when the journalist’s narrative and the soldier’s narrative 
become inexorably intertwined? In works such as We Were Soldiers Once… and Young 
we see a joint narrative described by two men who experienced combat, though with 
vastly different experiences with that time. Joseph Galloway and Harold Moore 
collaborated on this narrative to describe the heavy fighting in the Ia Drang Valley in 
1965 during the American escalation in South Vietnam. What separates this from the 
previous narratives discussed are the two distinct voices that appear throughout the book. 
When we hear from Colonel Moore, we see a systematic military voice, one that has seen 
combat but also has a full understanding of the strategy behind military action. We see 
this quite clearly in the descriptions of troop movements during the battle. Moore writes, 
“My battalion used a simple two up, one back formation – A/2/5 on the left, B/1/7 on the 
right, [and] C/2/5 following A/2/5.” In doing so, Moore can provide the audience with an 
idea of how the military functions during combat operations. He can dissect strategy and 
explain in layman’s terms what happened on a grand level. However, this creates a 
strange sort of detachment from the human side of the battle. Moore alleviates this to a 
certain extent by highlighting his feelings towards the end of the battle, along with brief 
asides on the high regard he held for his men. “I made it very clear,” Moore writes, 
“…that I was the first man of my battalion to set foot in this terrible killing ground and I 
damned well intended to be the last man to leave (Moore & Galloway 185).” In those 
words he shows the burdens held by an officer, that the lives of his men and the 
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importance of the officer on the field outweighed his own wish to make it home alive. 
This goes on to his respect for the men under his command. When Sergeant Kluge comes 
in as the 7th Calvary’s relief he comes upon a fallen soldier in a foxhole, directing his 
men to drag the deceased back to the rallying area. Colonel Moore directs them 
otherwise. As Sergeant Kluge recalls, “[Colonel Moore] came up behind me and said: 
‘No, you won’t do that Sergeant. He’s one of my troopers and you will show respect. Get 
two more men and carry him to the landing zone. (Moore 197).”  
With that in mind, we must then see the media’s voice when it comes to Joseph 
Galloway’s account. Given the structure of the narrative, the voices are so intertwined it 
can be difficult to separate the two during the reading. Galloway mostly comes through in 
between Moore’s personal recollections of strategy and of the battle, where we see voices 
of the men who fought at LZ X-Ray interviewed in a journalistic style. In fact, it is within 
these in-betweens that we get any sense of Galloway’s feelings on the battle when his 
own voice comes through. This is all the clearer in the aftermath of the firefight at LZ X-
Ray when more journalists arrive on the scene to get a sense of what had happened. 
When all of the journalists hit the ground at the sound of some errant rifle fire, Galloway 
still stands, saying, “Bullshit. That stuff ain’t aimed at us (Moore & Galloway 197).” The 
other journalists are further described by Galloway and Moore as looking nervous as they 
fanned out around the battlefield, must as Galloway had been when he had first got there. 
What this goes to illustrate, insofar as media voices go, is that the act of combat affects 
people on a noticeable level regardless of their training or background. More interesting, 
however, is that the narrative does not probe this idea further. Galloway and Moore seem 
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to keep an objective distance from the carnage, with only smatterings of the effect of 
combat on those they have interviewed. The chapter Policing the Battlefield has the most 
emotion of the entire narrative at that point, giving a sense of the aftermath of that 
prolonged combat. In quoting Jack Smith, one of the journalists who landed after the 
firefight, the authors show us that the men “said little, just looked around with darting, 
nervous eyes. Whenever [Smith] heard a shell [come] close, [he’d] duck for cover but 
[the soldiers] kept standing (Moore and Galloway 195).” This is followed by the other 
journalists exclaiming that the landing zone looked like there had been a bloodbath, as 
the landing zone was littered with fallen soldiers and wounded. This is the closest look 
we get at what a firefight can leave in its wake, evoking the emotions that the majority of 
the combat descriptions are lacking. Later in the chapter “The Secretary of the Army 
regrets…” we are further introduced to some of the struggle of families coming to terms 
with those lost in the Ia Drang.  
That is not to say that the narrative is bad for missing the human component. In 
fact, it is quite the opposite; the narrative gives insight into what happens on a strategic 
level while also illustrating the individual actions of the men who took part in the 
fighting. This serves as an anchor to the more emotional tales provided by Rizzutti, 
Kovic, and many others. While those narratives show us the “boots on the ground” 
perspective we do not see combat from the perspective of the officers who command 
them. This, as discussed, can lead to a feeling of disconnect from the narrative as, when 
reading, we are given a bird’s eye view rather than the up close and personal views 
provided by the solo narrative. Moore and Galloway’s omniscient viewpoint, though, can 
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give perspectives that would otherwise be missed if seen from only one man. This is seen 
on Colonel Moore’s return to the camp at Pleiku when they visit the bar. Upon their 
entry, they are denied as the “[officer’s club] did not belong to them (Moore and 
Galloway 205).” Moore then put his weapons on the bar, threatening to “clean house” if 
he was not served drinks he and his men had earned over the last few days (206). When 
another officer comes in, though, retelling Moore’s fight in the Ia Drang they are given 
drinks that “they couldn’t buy,” and are able to unwind (206). This scene, an excerpt 
lifted from J.D Coleman’s book The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare, serves three purposes. 
One, to give us an omniscient scene that provides Moore’s stress after the fight from a set 
of eyes that is not an author. Two, the scene is meant to illustrate the intense stress that an 
officer can carry before, during, and after a firefight. And finally, three, the excerpt 
begins to demonstrate the amount of respect given within military units to those who 
have been in combat, and have lived to tell about it. The third aspect, of that scene, is 
perhaps the most interesting. In both Terry Rizzutti and Ron Kovic’s narratives the theme 
of questioning one’s heroics in horrific circumstances is a mainstay throughout their 
respective journeys. With Colonel Moore jointly controlling the narrative with the media, 
however, there is an insistence that all of the men in the Ia Drang valley are heroes 
deserving of undying respect.  
Are all of these men heroes? For simply doing their duty which they have signed 
on for, it becomes hard to see why all of these men are considered to be heroic. What 
does it mean to be a hero? For Hal Moore and Galloway, heroism stems from sacrifice in 
the line of duty. Whether those sacrifices comes at the ultimate price of death or from the 
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person to person costs of having engaged in combat, the pair make it clear that service in 
a combat zone is something heroic and worth recognition. On the other hand, we see Ron 
Kovic and Terry Rizzutti grappling with the idea that their actions in battle were unheroic 
and not worth recognition for the high cost of combat. There is a dichotomy here that I 
would argue is underlined by the media involvement in Hal Moore’s narrative. As we see 
in The Spitting Image, the media is highly involved and intertwined in the portrayal of 
heroism to the public when it comes to military action.  
What does this say about the truth in the war narrative? Is war structured? Is it 
chaotic? Are there heroes? Given these narratives, we get the idea that war is all of these 
things. War is a walking paradox of order and chaos, and to get a full view of what these 
narratives bring us about the truth it is necessary to view all sides. While the integrative 
narrative between soldier and media gives us an encompassing view we can further 
enrich that narrative by layering in the intensely personal accounts of combat and the war 
experience that give us this paradoxical understanding that is armed conflict. If we view 
the integrative narrative as the best way to get the full scope of the war story, where does 
that leave us today when war has become so highly politicized? Going forward, the 
integrative approach to control over the war narrative becomes all the more important to 
finding the truth in combat. 
  
38 
 
  
IV. Integration in the Modern Era 
With these narratives in mind, in what ways did the media and military 
relationship change in the years following Vietnam? I, briefly, discussed an example of 
an integrative narrative: a narrative that pulls in both civilian and soldier voices in order 
to give a fuller sense of what war is. In this increasingly politicized war climate, though, 
how can we find the truth amidst the modern conflicts in the Middle East? In order to 
answer this, we must look at how military policy altered in the years following the 
Vietnam War and how those changes carried into the modern conflicts. Within that 
context, we can see the integrative narrative become all the more important as politics 
and combat become further intertwined. As we will see, this approach is not without fault 
as politics and personal feelings can pollute the truth, therein painting a narrative that is 
not fully indicative of what truly happens on the modern battlefield. It becomes, in some 
cases, ways to make war palatable to the masses rather than provide an accurate portrait 
of modern war.  
Coming out of the Vietnam War, the military decided to keep the news media and 
personnel at arms-length by setting limits on the number of journalists allowed in conflict 
zones while also severely limiting their access to areas of operation. Vietnam was seen by 
the military as a blunder of censorship policy, a time where heavier censorship could 
have mitigated the outcry of the public against the war. By replacing the leash that the 
military had once held over reporters, they could reign in public support and therein help 
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to legitimize times of conflict and strife. This would limit some of the control that the 
news media had gained over the war narrative during the late 60s and early 70s, instead 
turning that control directly over to the military and soldiers. Media, though, clearly 
could be used as a tool for the support of war, so keeping it on a tight leash would bring 
about a reasonable outcome for military and government policy, that is, to galvanize 
support for future wars fought abroad.  
Pascale Combelles-Siegel, an analyst researching policy with the Department of 
Defense, writes that between Vietnam, the conflict in Grenada, and the Gulf War in 1992, 
“the Pentagon engaged in negotiations and unilateral actions to try to improve media 
access to the battlefield (Combelles-Siegel 9).” In the aftermath of Grenada, the Pentagon 
came to five basic tenets in order to improve Public Affairs operations in the event of 
armed conflict. Combelles-Siegel lists them thusly: 
I. “Public affairs planning should begin as soon as operational planning 
begins. 
II. News pooling should only be used in the early phases of operations until 
full coverage is possible 
III. The Secretary of Defense should keep an updated accreditation list of 
correspondents in case of a military operation in need of a news pool 
IV. The basic principle governing media access should be compliance with 
predetermined ground rules set by the military 
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V. Public Affairs should plan logistics for both communications and 
transport” 
This list highlights the policies that the military put in place in order to limit the control 
media could have over the story. By generating news pools the military could select 
exactly which information needed to be provided to reporters and the ways in which they 
could use those stories. That is not to say that there were no reporters present at these 
conflicts, as reporters attached to units became increasingly used, and popular, with 
military officials. If the military wanted the best way to show the media the stories to tell, 
it would be to embed them into a military unit. In this way, officers and soldiers could 
paint the picture that would represent them best.  
Indeed, embedding led us to some of the best representations of the integrative 
narrative, allowing for further joint control over a war story that showed the reporter’s 
fact-finding along with the soldier’s human experience in the midst of combat. It is not 
without fault, however, as reporters stationed in the field will miss out on the wider 
context of the war. Patrick Cockburn, an editorialist for the Independent News Corp in 
the UK, draws from his own experience being embedded saying that “it leads reporters to 
see the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts primarily in military terms, while the most important 
developments are political or… have little to do with foreign forces (Cockburn 2010).” 
Further, he recalls that there are some embedded journalists that “drink up everything the 
army tells them and [reports] it as fact,” indicating that the army still wanted to retain 
control over the stories that would come out of the reporter’s time with their respective 
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unit. This highlights the underlying danger of embedding that is, being pointed in such a 
direction that the wider context of the conflict is missed in the reporting and the retelling 
of the narrative. While you may get the human side of the story combined with the 
overarching military strategy, you then may miss the political undercutting, war 
atrocities, and the wider social-cultural scene derived from war time.  
This became especially clear with the American occupation of Iraq. In Dexter 
Filkins’ The Forever War, Filkins provides us the dichotomy drawn between what the 
army wants to show embedded reporters and what occurs behind the veil. This is shown 
no clearer than in his account of visiting the neo-natal ward at an Iraqi hospital. Paul 
Bremer, a military official with Coalition Provisional Authority, accompanies Filkins to 
the hospital and within his speech to local Iraqis he lauds the positive changes to Iraq in 
regards to public health. “There is eleven times more electricity now than before we 
arrived,” he says, further giving the idea that the invasion was good for the Iraqi people 
(Filkins 137). Though, when Filkins breaks off from the government entourage, he finds 
that medically things are not as well as they seem. Following the invasion electricity may 
have been more plentiful, but it was more susceptible to blackouts; blackouts spell 
disaster for hospitals, especially in neo-natal and trauma wards. Hassan Naji, a hospital 
record keeper, tells Filkins “democracy has ruined this hospital,” and the rampant looting 
following the American dismantling of the Saddam Hussein regime has left the hospital 
with minimal supplies and inefficient record keeping. What we see of Bremer, the side of 
the story that is in support of Americans, shows us one that tries to turn a blind eye to the 
tragedy unfolding at the hospital as he merely pauses to say “I don’t like seeing this at 
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all,” before simply moving on to the next administrative matter (138). This demonstrates 
that government officials wanted to maintain the heroic narrative to the accompanying 
press. Yes, there are some negative outcomes to our invasion, they seem to say, but look 
at all the good we’re doing. It takes Filkins the physical act of separating from that 
entourage in order to tell the real story back to the United States; he shows that the war 
has more overreaching consequence than most outlets would provide to the public. The 
real story in this case being that the American occupation was having a heavy toll on 
human life beyond that of the combat – that there was more context to the war than the 
fighting. He was not alone either; his story is corroborated by New York Times where 
they write that “the first few weeks of American occupation… have left a great deal to be 
desired (New York Times 2003).”  
Even if the Army does want to control the sights of reporters, they cannot 
guarantee that they will not investigate further when they are able. By trying to strictly 
control what gets out, they tend to enable reporters to go further to get the whole story. 
This does carry its own challenges though, as the allure of editorializing can place some 
gaps into the truth. While the political context is paramount in providing the context for 
what a soldier’s narrative means to the historical narrative, it is possible to muddy the 
truth to place the soldiers as merely a service to the wider political narrative. In an article 
for the New Yorker, George Packer writes that “Journalists and historians have to distort 
war: in order to find the plot—causation, sequence, meaning—they make war more 
intelligible than it really is (Packer 2014).” Throughout the article, he discusses how the 
soldier’s control over the war narrative is vital to the understanding of what it does to 
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people; in essence, Packer is providing us with the soldier’s truths and how those are an 
integral key of the telling of the war narrative in a more chaotic nature than a journalist 
would. He notes that the modern narratives coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan maintains 
the idea of “exploded illusions,” or the idea that war does not play out as anyone had 
expected. While these stories are fewer and far between giving the recentness of the 
conflict, they provide adequate backdrop to begin finding the truths to the combat 
occurring overseas. Packer cites David Finkel’s book Thank You for Your Service where 
he makes the claim that the culture surrounding supporting the troops has become one of 
passive neglect. He writes, “[The soldiers] returned to heroes’ welcomes and a flickering 
curiosity. Because hardly anyone back home really wanted to know, the combatant’s 
status turned into a mark of otherness, a blessing and a curse (Packer 2014).” This is an 
important claim. We on the home front want to support the soldiers, to empathize with 
their struggle and yet we do not want to see the harsh truths of war. We prefer, according 
to Packer, to keep those stories at arm’s length as long as our fighting men and women 
come home again. We even saw this highlighted in Ron Kovic’s memoir coming out 
from the 1970s: “We’ve seen enough of [disfigured veterans]. Every night for the last 
couple of years people have seen it on the six o’clock news and they’re tired of it (Kovic 
148).”  
This explains why stories on the wars in the Middle East have dropped off in 
recent years. People get tired of the harshness of war, and they want to see that things are 
going well while hoping they’ll get to see their veterans cared for and home again. We 
inherently want to be sheltered from the violence, a key reason why we do not see the 
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images of fallen American troops. If something is out of sight, it is out of mind and is 
easier to handle and make sense of. I argue that this is where an integrative approach of 
journalist and soldier becomes all the more important. It is a narrative that is written with 
a civilian eye with the soldier’s experience put at the forefront of the telling. This is made 
clear by both the work of Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington and also the work of 
Evan Wright. 
For this, we must turn first to Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington in their 
work on the book War and also on the twin documentaries Korengal and Restrepo. 
Junger, a contributor to Vanity Fair and ABC News, spent a year in the Korengal Valley 
of Afghanistan, a hotly contested plot of land in the northeastern region of the country. 
During that year, he was embedded with the men of the 503rd and sought to relay the war 
experience back to the people back home. This project was two-fold: one to portray to the 
American people what a combat situation would truly look like and the other to provide 
insight into what a soldier thinks during the war, and how it lingers with them afterwards. 
In a 2014 interview with Rolling Stone Magazine he says that “I very consciously wanted 
audiences to feel like they were getting as close as they could to the combat experience… 
to [give audiences] a little bit more perspective on things (Fear 2014).” He recognizes 
that Restrepo was meant to “be an experience” while Korengal was meant “to be more of 
an exploration” of what was occurring in the fighting in Afghanistan (Fear 2014). This is 
the integrative narrative at work, shining a light on the different aspects of what the war 
experience can be. Junger, however, recognizes that his focus is solely on the human 
aspect of the story, writing that: 
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“The moral basis of the war doesn’t seem to interest soldiers much, and its long-
term success or failure has a relevance of almost zero. Soldiers worry about these 
things about as much as farmhands worry about the global economy, which is to 
say, they recognize stupidity when it’s right in front of them but they generally 
leave the big picture to others (Junger 25).” 
 This is further highlighted in direct comparisons to what a soldier understands as 
opposed to a civilian. “In a way that few civilians could understand,” he writes, “[the 
soldiers] were more at ease facing a known threat than languishing in the tropical heat 
facing an unknown one (Junger 35).” Junger shows here that the concerns of the soldier 
are far removed from the concerns they would have back home. He provides the idea that 
soldiers are concerned with the immediacy of a situation and the fact that they have a 
strong idea of what awaits them on patrol. As Captain Kearney tells us in Restrepo, they 
become hyper-vigilant on patrol. If so much of a rock is out of place a soldier asks 
himself, “Why is it out of place? Was someone walking above it to make it move?” while 
wondering if it is a warning sign to an ambush (Restrepo 2010).  
His goal, in the end, was to provide the audiences at home with a glimpse of what 
war is to the soldiers. “I wanted people to understand what these guys were going 
through… [because] a lot of the news wasn’t really telling people what was happening,” 
Junger said, further underlining his intention to help show the truth of war (Fear 2014). If 
the politics does not concern the men and women fighting the war, then it is not 
conducive to the provision of their view. Instead, he focuses on their feelings, their 
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thoughts on combat, and the strange behavior of “missing the war.” At a recent TED 
convention Junger explains the phenomenon of missing war. He outlines a culture that is 
fascinated with combat, where we pay money to be “entertained by a Hollywood war 
movie” and yet we “wouldn’t want to have anything to do with [war]” in our personal 
lives (Junger 2014). Junger says that we find combat compelling, and if we as “peace-
loving people” find war and violence so compelling, so must a “20-year old soldier who 
[has] been trained in it (Junger 2014).” He goes on to explain the neurological impacts of 
combat, the high-energy adrenaline rush that comes from getting shot at—an experience 
he himself can relate to—and how it brings on excitement and exhilaration that is not 
easily replaced. Furthermore, he goes on to describe the brotherhood that is forged when 
in a warzone. Junger differentiates this from friendship, however, defining brotherhood 
instead as “a mutual agreement in a group that you will put the welfare of the group, you 
will put the safety of everyone in the group above that of your own (Junger 2014).” Here 
lies the strength of the civilian eye providing insight into this experience. Sebastian 
Junger does not have combat training, despite having been a correspondent for over 
twenty years. Though in his experience in combat he can provide—in a civilian’s terms—
what it means to be in combat, and how that experience can linger on well after the war 
has ended. This understanding is crucial if we are to find any truth, though Junger 
believes that “war does not have a simple, neat truth,” instead he thinks that war is just as 
convoluted as ever, with these conflicting ideas of the horrors of combat, yet missing it 
when it’s gone, becoming his proof. If there is no simple truth, however, then the 
complex one must be all of these things aggregated.  
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If we shift our attention towards Evan Wright and his work on Generation Kill, 
we can see an entirely different narrative unfold than the one in the Korengal Valley that 
can show truth in war must be from an aggregate of experience rather than a single, 
simple truth. In 2003 Wright, reporting for Rolling Stone magazine, was embedded with 
the First Reconnaissance Battalion of Marines at the dawn of the U.S. incursion into Iraq. 
Wright’s job was simply to report on the marine’s movement into Iraq to unseat the 
regime of Saddam Hussein. What he got, though, was a far more complex narrative that 
probed into how soldiers conducted themselves on an interpersonal level. Yes, we still 
were provided the same ideas of brotherhood that Sebastian Junger reported for us, but 
Generation Kill got further into the downtime that soldiers can have at times, and how 
their interactions illustrate the culture of war. Being adapted into a television series from 
his original articles, we are given a unique opportunity to see this culture at play. We see 
the marines joking with each other and playing with crude, sometimes racist language. 
Corporal Josh Ray Person is shown reacting to a child’s letter as a cocky, killing 
machine, miming masturbation while saying that he’d “rather receive dirty porn 
[magazines]” than letters from kids (Generation Kill 2008). Now Evan Wright in writing 
this serves to show that these twenty or so year old marines act in much the same manner 
as a typical twenty-something. “People were offended,” he said in an interview with Big 
Think, “that these soldiers weren’t talking like Tom Hanks.” This is a stark reminder of 
what defines the Hollywood war story, and what a war narrative looks like. To continue 
the use of Tom Hanks in Saving Private Ryan as an example, we see the fictional soldiers 
as the strong heroic types who must always do the right, moral thing when placed up 
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against the evils of the Nazi Army. Where Saving Private Ryan is a tribute to war 
veterans, with increasingly heroic acts ending in the final desperate stand against a 
German counterattack where Tom Hanks sacrifices himself for the survival of his men, 
Generation Kill shows that war is never that clean or that heroic. These soldiers are not 
clean, heroic patriots. In fact, the one patriotic Captain Dave McGraw (nicknamed 
Captain America) is shown to be incompetent and openly commits a war crime when 
taking a prisoner by threating him with a gun to his head. Evan Wright portrays them as 
real people, fallible people who interact with each other as people casually would in such 
bizarre circumstances such as war.  
However, Wright provides this story in an accessible way for both the soldiers he 
claims to have written the book for and the audience back home. He highlights that he 
wanted to make the soldiers he got close to laugh, but also make them uncomfortable 
with things that Wright would report on. As far as laughing, this humor to him came from 
those casual relationships that he, like Junger, had the opportunity to forge while 
embedded with them. This is vital, as it highlights the soldiers he was with as the real 
people that they are and Wright gained that understanding in his experience with them. 
Wright became comfortable enough to joke with them, yet objective enough to be able to 
show some of the muck-ups of “incompetence” that he observed from some of the 
officers (Big Think 2012). Even the men themselves described a handful of the higher 
ups—especially shown by the men dubbing a group leader “Encino Man” and openly 
mocking him for wanting to be “overly tactical” during the initial stage of the invasion-- 
as going to any lengths to win medals or earn glory, often at the projected expense of the 
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men under them.  Wright does not shy away from the gory horror of war, often depicting 
the dead Iraqi soldiers and people over showing wounded American soldiers. While I 
would highlight this as a critique of his narrative as that avoids the American death 
surrounding war, since he did not actively experience a friendly casualty while embedded 
it makes sense that it would only be the Iraqi side that he would illustrate the intense 
death around them. In doing so, he shows us brief glimpses of the civilian suffering of 
war telling us that their lives (and their deaths) matter too and not just Americans. Yet 
Wright gives us an inside eye much like Sebastian Junger, and in that we find a strong 
look at the soldier’s culture in ways that only a civilian could observe. He recognizes the 
alien ways these interactions may seem but he embraces them as an integral part of what 
their experience is. This is the brotherhood that Junger spoke of, that even though they 
insult each other, shout out racial slurs at abandon, and hold some officers in contempt 
each one would willingly die for the other. The integrative narrative shows us this, and it 
is imperative we give these stories the same care and attention we would for any news 
story we might find. 
As the media’s role changed into the modern theaters of war, their role became all 
the more meaningful when applied properly. There are clear dangers of politicization and 
embedding in that war can be misrepresented as it unfolds, but if we show the human side 
of this story placed into the context of civilian culture the media’s role cannot be 
overstated. This is a clear evolution from Vietnam, and a change that can help us get to 
the bottom of what war truly is. If we can keep providing this integrative narrative as 
these wars come to a close, we can begin to mitigate the damage that future myths can 
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cause as we saw with the legacy of Vietnam. Therefore, it becomes all the more 
imperative that the integrative narrative becomes a cornerstone of what a war story can 
be.  
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V: Conclusion 
George Packer says that “There’s no truth in war – just each soldier’s 
experience,” yet, if we can aggregate their experiences, we can see the basic truths begin 
to become apparent. The media is a key player in finding truth in the war narrative, even 
if the soldier’s part may be the most important. It is in the ways that the media can deliver 
these narratives that are integral to how we can come to understand these stories. We 
have seen how the media gained a large amount of sway in the telling of the war 
narrative, and how in turn it affected the stories and memories of the Vietnam War. 
However, we have seen the changing relationship of the media and the military, and how 
an integrative narrative becomes paramount in tying those stories into where we can 
derive truth. 
Why is this important? Today we have woven war into every aspect of our 
society. The film American Sniper has grossed $209 million in the weeks since its 
release, the video game series Call of Duty has sold more than 64.92 million units 
worldwide. We have reduced war to simplistic myths of heroes with little context, and 
assigning point values to accruing endless kills against anonymous people over the 
internet. We are still involved in military action overseas despite recent downscaling of 
armed forces in the Middle East. The narratives coming from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 
mounting conflict with ISIS will be directly affected by how they are represented and 
portrayed to the public. How we remember these conflicts is tied directly to how they are 
written about and reported. We saw with Vietnam that myths of that war are still
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prevalent today, with fallout reaching from the justification for further armed conflict to 
as far as how we ought to treat our returning veterans. Our nation faces a difficult 
question as these conflicts wind down and gear up: how ought we to handle war in our 
society? 
If we take these integrative narratives, and we place them in conversation with the 
wider political and cultural context we might find the truth in war. “There is no one, 
simple truth to war,” says Sebastian Junger, but we can try to aggregate one. War is 
sadistic, war is heroic, war can build countries, and war can break them. I do not know 
what war really is without experiencing it, but I can try.  
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